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NOTES AND COMMENTS
On Your Mark, Get Set, Stop! Drug-
Testing Appeals in the International
Amateur Athletic Federation
I. INTRODUCTION
Amateur athletes must abide by strict rules set out by various
organizations to be eligible to compete in athletic events. Elite
athletes wishing to compete in the Olympic Games have many con-
cerns besides their athletic performance. These athletes must fol-
low drug-testing rules set forth by their nation's Olympic
Committee, the International Olympic Committee, and interna-
tional athletic federations.' If an athlete tests positive for drugs
before, during, or after competition, he or she may be declared in-
eligible, and a world record can be invalidated. 2 In order to equal-
ize competition and to "safeguard the health of the young
competitors," drug testing has become a necessary part of interna-
tional sports.3
To understand the complexities of drug testing for the
Olympic Games, one must first understand the relationship among
the many organizations that promulgate and enforce the drug-test-
ing guidelines. The International Olympic Committee ("IOC") "is
the highest authority" within the Olympic structure.4 The IOC
oversees the national olympic committees ("NOCs"), such as the
1. See THE HONOURABLE CHARLES L. DUBIN COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION OF IN-
QUIRY INTO THE USE OF DRUGS AND BANNED PRACTICES INTENDED To INCREASE ATH-
LETIC PERFORMANCE 80-89, 128-36 (1990) [hereinafter DUBIN COMMISSION]; see also
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC CHARTER AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT (1988).
2. For example, during the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Ben Johnson tested positive for
steroids. He was stripped of his gold medal and his world record was invalidated. Further-
more, he was suspended from competition for two years. Michael Janofsky, Johnson Loses
Gold to Lewis After Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1988, at Al.
3. Eric Dobberstein, Note, Drug Testing: The Toughest Competition an Athlete Ever
Faces, 13 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 145-46 (1988). But see Norman Fost, Banning Drugs
in Sports: A Skeptical View, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1986, at 5-9.
4. Marfa Tai Wolff, Recent Developments, Playing by the Rules? A Legal Analysis
of the United States Olympic Committee-Soviet Olympic Committee Doping Control
Agreement, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (1989).
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United States Olympic Committee ("USOC"), and international
federations ("IFs") for individual sports, such as the International
Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF") for track and field ath-
letes.5 There are also national federations ("NFs") of an IF, such
as The Athletic Congress ("TAC"), which is the governing body for
track and field in the United States.6 Furthermore, "the IOC can
discipline an NOC by directing the IFs to suspend [a] country's
affiliate" 7 like the TAC.
This Note will review Harry "Butch" Reynolds' dispute with
the IAAF before the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. The IAAF de-
clared Butch Reynolds, the 1988 Olympic silver medalist in the
four-hundred meters, ineligible after a 1990 track meet in Monte
Carlo for allegedly using the steroid nandrolone.8 The IAAF
banned Reynolds from amateur track and field competitions for
two years; this ban extended until August 12, 1992, after the 1992
Barcelona Olympics. 9 Reynolds claimed that he did not use ster-
oids and that the IAAF violated its own procedural rules in finding
that he tested positive for nandrolone. 10
This Note will examine the procedural and administrative
events leading up to Reynolds' suspension from international com-
petition and the subsequent appeal process. When the IAAF de-
nied Reynolds' appeals, he brought suit in federal district court."
Subsequently, the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals' 2 and to the U.S. Supreme Court 3 within two days. This
Note will review the findings in Reynolds and examine the issue of
jurisdiction over the IAAF.
5. Id. at 617. The IAAF, an "unincorporated association of 184 members, is the
international governing body for track and field." DUBIN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at
444.
6. The Athletic Congress is the U.S. Track and Field member of the IAAF. See
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 153 (1988).
7. Wolff, supra note 4, at 617.
8. Phil Hersh, Supreme Court Backs Reynolds[;] But Runners in 400 Vote To Skip
Race, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1992, at C1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C-2-92-452, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8625 (E.D. Ohio June 19, 1992) [hereinafter Reynolds 1].
12. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 92-3596, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14058 (6th Cir. June 19, 1992) (unpublished opinion) [hereinafter Reynolds II].
13. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, __ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2512, 120
L. Ed. 2d 861 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1992) [hereinafter Reynolds 1].
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The IAAF claims that no court has jurisdiction over its organi-
zation.14 Nevertheless, the Reynolds I court found that the IAAF
satisfies the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction and
that it is, therefore, subject to the court's jurisdiction.15 Subse-
quent to the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion holding that Butch
Reynolds could compete in the U.S. Olympic Track and Field tri-
als,16 the IAAF threatened that the United States must pass legisla-
tion regarding IAAF jurisdiction before the 1996 Atlanta Summer
Olympics; the IAAF stated that Congress' failure to pass legisla-
tion may result in significant tensions between the IAAF and U.S.
courts over potential decisions allowing U.S. athletes to compete
on U.S. soil.17
This Note will conclude that there must be some alternate fo-
rum for amateur athletes to raise their complaints after they have
exhausted the administrative remedies that the IAAF provides.
There is a problem with IAAF member nations having jurisdiction
over the IAAF because, even if they purport to be neutral, individ-
ual nation's courts may be biased toward their own athletes. On
the other hand, it is problematic for the IAAF to have jurisdiction
over individual athletes, some of whom complain that the IAAF
denies them procedural due process in its decisions.18 Focusing on
14. See Randy Harvey, IAAF Isn't Helping the Sport's Image, L.A. TIMEs, June 20,
1992, at C6. In June 1992, the IAAF's President, Primo Nebiolo, stated: "We will never
accept a decision of any court in the world against our rules." Id.
15. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *18. See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that 'minimum contacts' are a prerequisite for personal
jurisdiction).
16. Reynolds III, supra note 13.
17. In a press release after the Supreme Court allowed Reynolds to compete in the
Olympic Trials in New Orleans, the IAAF asked that
the United States Olympic Committee and The Athletics Congress ... engage as
soon as possible the proper authorities in the US [sic] government to enact legis-
lation that will prevent civil courts from acting in the matters of amateur sport. If
such legislation is not achieved, the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996 . . .will
risk grave damage.
David Powell, Reynolds Quickly Back on Track, THE TiMEs (London), June 24, 1992; Tom
Weir, Reynolds Lets Emotions Run Loose, USA TODAY, June 24, 1992, at 11C; see Julie
Cart, Reynolds Keeps Winning, This Time on the Track, L.A. TimEs, June 24, 1992, at C1.
18. Michael Stulce, 1992 Olympic gold medalist in the shot-put who had previously
been banned for using drugs and served out his two-year ban, stated that the IAAF process
"[ijs a witch hunt... [and is] totally out of control. We're basically slaves in the system.
The burden of proof is on us. We have no due process. There's nothing we can do." Joe
Concannon, US Puts Forth Its Best Shots, Summer Olympics '92, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1,
1992, at 39. Jackie Joyner-Kersee, world long-jump champion, claims that "she [is] upset
because of the seeming powerlessness of the athletes to redress grievances as well as the
scorning of the court ruling by the IAAF. 'It's like we're handcuffed, we're puppets and
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Reynolds, this Note will conclude that the appeals process for an
IAAF-banned athlete is in need of drastic improvement. The right
of appeal should be to a body other than the one that originally
imposed the penalty.
This Note will also examine American athletes' claims against
the IAAF based on the function of the IAAF appeals system. An
athlete is first notified about his or her positive test, suspended,
and then allowed to pursue an appeal.19 Thus, an athlete cannot
offer evidence on his or her behalf before a suspension. Eliminat-
ing drugs from sports is important, and the IAAF has specific
mandatory procedures for drug testing athletes.20 If proper proce-
dures are not followed, however, it is unfair to ban an athlete for a
so-called positive drug test, especially if the result is equivocal.
21
United States statutory rights under the Amateur Sports Act of
197822 are in conflict with rules that the IAAF promulgates for the
drug-testing appeals process. This Note will propose solutions for
this conflict.
This Note proposes that the Court of Arbitration for Sport
("CAS") 23 is the best forum to hear athletes' claims of faulty drug-
testing procedures. Although there are disadvantages to the CAS
because some of its jurists are chosen by IFs,24 this body is more
impartial than the IAAF. In addition, once the parties consent to
its jurisdiction, its decision is binding.25 Moreover, if NFs remove
we've just got to go out there and do what we're told to do ... ' Court Says Yes, IAAF
Says No, So Reynolds Sits Out, WASH. PosT, May 31, 1992, at D7.
19. See Michael Janofsky, Track and Field;- Reynolds Case Spotlights Battle of the Reg-
ulators, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 11, 1991, at B15.
20. See INTERNATIONAL AMATEUR ATHLEnc FEDERATION rule 144, at 100-04 (1988-
89) (official handbook).
21. Some athletes, however, may dishonestly protest their innocence to continue com-
peting. While no one except Butch Reynolds may ever know whether he really took nan-
drolone, as the procedures were not precisely followed, it is not fair to presume his guilt
without a hearing. It may not be morally right to lift a guilty athlete's ban based on a
procedural error, but otherwise, due process rights are worthless. The Dubin Commission
pointed out that, before the IAAF began vigorous enforcement of its anti-doping rules, it
was less than diligent in drug testing. DuBN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 446. The Com-
mission also commented on "the IAAF's apparent lack of serious intent to implement its
own policies and procedures and to compel the national federations to comply." Id.
22. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1978).
23. See generally NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 35-37, 66-67, 153, 221-27. See also
Michael Dockterman, International Sports Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 690-94 (1989) (book
review). See infra notes 145-59.
24. See NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 35-36.
25. Id. at 36. Furthermore, the CAS can "resolve such disputes as those involving an
athlete's suspension from competition from drug abuse." Id.
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from their constitutions loopholes that allow athletes to avoid sus-
pensions, the number of conflicts between the IAAF and the NFs
would decrease.
Finally, this Note will propose that the procedures used in
drug testing athletes must be greatly improved and that the proce-
dural rights of athletes must conform with the statutory rights of
each NF's country or the credibility of the system will be irretriev-
ably lost. Inconsistency threatens the reliability of IAAF proce-
dures when an athlete's ban is lifted because of technicalities in his
or her NF's constitution, while others have their bans extended for
fighting the system. Although gains have been made by, for exam-
ple, the U.S.-Soviet Doping Control Agreement,26 the IAAF must
improve its procedures. The IAAF must ensure that the chain of
custody is followed and that labs process the samples for testing
quickly and reliably. If procedures are followed improperly, the
IAAF should not ban an athlete, for doing so only highlights the
inconsistencies that undermine the authority of the IAAF.27 Fur-
thermore, once the IAAF improves its appeals process, it will be-
come more credible and, therefore, less susceptible to civil suits
around the world.
Part II of this Note will profile the events leading up to Reyn-
olds' case against the IAAF. In Part III, this Note will analyze the
opinions of the district, appellate, and Supreme Court in Reynolds.
Part IV will cover the treatment of other Olympic athletes in simi-
lar situations. Part V will discuss the jurisdictional issues involved
and the proposed solutions for an independent arbitrator to hear
appeals. Finally, Part VI will briefly cover U.S. athletes' rights
under the IAAF appeals process.
II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO REYNOLDS
On August 12, 1990, after placing third in an international
track meet in Monte Carlo, Butch Reynolds took a routine drug
26. See generally Wolff, supra note 4.
27. Another example of IAAF unfairness is a new rule that the IAAF adopted in
1990. The rule states that a written or oral admission of taking a banned substance is
enough to ban an athlete from competition. The IAAF applied this rule retroactively to
Ben Johnson and to Angella Issajenko, another Canadian 100 and 200 meter champion.
After the rule went into effect, both athletes admitted that they used banned substances
prior to the rule's effective date. The IAAF then banned them from competition based on
their admissions. DUBIN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 549. This rule is understandable;
however, applying it retroactively "contravenes every principle of natural justice and fair-
ness." Id. at 550.
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test.28 On November 5, 1990, the IAAF reported that Reynolds
tested positive for nandrolone, a steroid on the list of IOC-banned
drugs, and requested TAC to suspend him from competition for
two years. 29 Reynolds immediately proclaimed his innocence.
30
In March 1991, Reynolds asked for a court order to force TAC
to allow him to compete again.31 Reynolds stated that he never
used nandrolone, challenged the identification of the urine sam-
ples, and argued that TAC banned him without a hearing and
thereby denied him his due process rights.32 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the case
because Reynolds had not exhausted his administrative appeals,
which are a prerequisite to the court's exercising subject matter
jurisdiction.33 Reynolds then asked the appellate court to stay his
suspension so that he could run in the 1991 U.S. National Champi-
onships, the qualifying meet for the World Championships.
34
Again, the Sixth Circuit dismissed his suit because he had not ex-
hausted his administrative remedies.3
5
On June 10, 1991, however, the American Arbitration Associ-
ation ("AAA") temporarily lifted his ban and ordered TAC to per-
mit Reynolds to run in the National Championships.36 Reynolds
brought his case to the AAA under a rule in the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978.37 The AAA found that there was "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that the two alleged Reynolds samples were not
28. See Hersh, supra note 8.
29. See Michael Janofsky, 2 U.S. Track Stars Face 2-year Ban for Drug Use, N.Y.
TimEs, Nov. 6, 1990, at Al.
In cases of a positive finding .... the international federation instructs the na-
tional federation to suspend the athlete, and usually, it is done at once. But with
athletes from the United States, the process is delayed while the athlete exhausts
an appeal process available through The Athletic Congress. Then, only if the
positive finding is upheld, would the athlete be suspended.
ld.
30. Id.
31. Sprinter Reynolds Appeals Ruling, WASH. PosT, Mar. 28, 1991, at B2. Reynolds'
suit was for permanent reinstatement and $12.5 million in damages. Reynolds Still To
Compete in U.S. Track Championships, REtrrs, June 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuter File [hereinafter Reynolds Still To Compete].
32. Reynolds v. Athletic Congress, No. C-2-91-003 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 1991).
33. See Reynolds Turned Down, N.Y. TimFs, Apr. 5, 1991, at A20.
34. See Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *3.
35. Id.
36. Reynolds Still To Compete, supra note 31.
37. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 395(c). See also John Jeansonne, One-
Week Furlough from Steroid Prison; Reynolds Wins in Court but Loses Race, NEWSDAY,
June 14, 1991, at 192. The AAA decision applies only to competitions among U.S. citizens,
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from the same person and "substantial evidence" that neither was
from Reynolds.38 While TAC reluctantly allowed Reynolds to
compete because federal law compels TAC to respect the federal
arbitrator's decision, 39 the IAAF demanded that TAC enforce
Reynolds' ban. This conflict existed because TAC must first follow
federal rules before it follows international sports rules.4° TAC Ex-
ecutive Director, Ollan Cassell, stated:
The IAAF has the authority to take sanctions against us if it
wants to. I would be surprised if they did. In view of what our
laws are and their rules are, we had no choice but to allow
Reynolds to run unless we wanted to go to jail or be held in
contempt of court.
41
The IAAF then threatened to invoke its "contamination rule" 42
against the other athletes who competed against Reynolds.
Although the IAAF did not ban the other "contaminated" ath-
letes, the IAAF indicated that Reynolds' running was "unlawful"
and that it could "endanger the participation of American athletes
in major world competitions," and threatened to extend his suspen-
sion.43 Thus, the IAAF did not enforce its rules for Reynolds' un-
lawful competition, although the IAAF reiterated that it had no
doubt that the positive test results were accurate. 4
Subsequently, Reynolds appealed to TAC. Reynolds had to
prove his innocence in his hearing before a three-person Doping
Control Board on September 13, 1991, because he was "presumed
guilty until proven innocent. '45 On October 4, 1991, TAC's Board
overturned the IAAF suspension because of procedural errors in
as it is an administrative remedy for U.S. citizens. See 36 U.S.C. § 395(c); see also Ban
Lifted, Reynolds To Run in N.Y., CI. TRm., June 11, 1991, at C6.
38. Reynolds Still To Compete, supra note 31.
39. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 391.
40. See Jeansonne, supra note 37, at 192.
41. Randy Harvey, Reynolds Runs, Fails To Qualify, L.A. Tirvms, June 14, 1991, at C2.
42. Id. Under IAAF Rule 53(ii), the IAAF can suspend every athlete who "has taken
part in any athletic meeting or event in which any of the competitors were, to his knowl-
edge, ineligible to compete under IAAF rules." INTERNATIONAL AMATEUR ATHLETIC
FEDERATION, supra note 20, rule 53, at 77-78. See also Phil Hersh, Reynolds Runs, Puts
TAC, IAAF at Odds, CHm. TRM., June 14, 1991, at C3.
43. IAAF Warns Reynolds Against Repeat Performance, UPI, June 15, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
44. Stephen Parry, IAAF Threatens U.S. Suspension if Doping Ban Is Defied Again,
REUTERS, June 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
45. Dick Patrick, Reynolds Resumes Drug Appeal, USA TODAY, Sept. 13,1991, at 2C.
19941 543
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the handling and testing of the sample by a Paris laboratory.46 This
decision cleared Reynolds for domestic competition only. His next
step was an appeal to the IAAF to compete internationally. Reyn-
olds had TAC's support for the appeal set for November 16, 1991. 4 7
The IAAF repeatedly postponed Reynolds' case.48 Commen-
tators speculated that the IAAF did not want to jeopardize the ac-
curacy or reputation of the Paris laboratory that analyzed
Reynolds' sample because the laboratory also tested samples for
the Winter Olympics. 4 9 Meanwhile, in April 1992, TAC cleared
Reynolds for more domestic competition pending his hearing
before the IAAF.o Finally, on May 11, 1992, an IAAF arbitration
board upheld Reynolds' suspension, thus prohibiting him from
competing in the Olympics.5 1 Reynolds again professed his inno-
cence and protested the IAAF's lack of diligence in adhering to its
drug-testing procedures.5 2 His agent, Brad Hunt, complained that
the IAAF Board spent only two hours considering Reynolds'
claim5 3
46. Mark Asher & Christine Brennan, TAC Clears Reynolds of Steroid Use Charge;
International Hearing His Next Hurdle, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1991, at G7. Also, the Board
concluded that one of the two samples which tested positive was not that of Reynolds. Id.
"TAC's decision will be widely viewed as an attempt to undermine the IAAF's drug-testing
program." Phil Hersh, Clearing of Reynolds Opens TAC-IAAF Fight, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6,
1991, at C8.
47. TAC Exonerates Reynolds of Alleged Steroids Use, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.
5, 1991.
48. Karen Rosen, Reynolds' Agent Questions Delay in Hearing Date, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Jan. 12, 1992, at E8.
49. Id. Further, "[t]he IOC accredited laboratories are reluctant to have the accuracy
of their tests challenged. They have a legitimate concern that releasing technical informa-
tion would allow athletes interested in cheating to benefit from that information." DUBIN
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 497.
50. Jack Carey, Reynolds' Hope, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1C. See also Phil
Hersh, TAC/USA Clears Reynolds for Domestic Competition, CI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1992, at
C8.
51. Julie Cart, Panel Refuses To Lift Ban on Record-Holder Reynolds, L.A. TIMES,
May 12, 1992, at C3. The panel's president from Finland stated that the panel "was con-
vinced that the samples were Reynolds', that they contained nandrolone, [and] that they
had not been tampered with." Id The decision of the panel "demonstrates the extreme
difficulty any athlete faces trying to prove his innocence once a test result has been ruled
official." Michael Janofsky, World Panel Denies Reynolds' Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1992, at B15.
52. Dan Giesin, Reynolds Continues His Quest, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 1992, at D3;
Dick Patrick, Reynolds Will Contend Error in Drug Test Appeal, USA TODAY, May 14,
1992, at 9C.
53. The AAA spent four days and TAC spent two weeks considering Reynolds'
claims. Cart, supra note 51.
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Because Reynolds had exhausted the administrative appeals
process established by the IAAF, he went to his last resort-the
U.S. courts. Reynolds filed a lawsuit against the IAAF, asking for
$12.5 million in damages.5 4 An Ohio federal district court judge
ordered a temporary restraining order against the IAAF, allowing
Reynolds to compete in pre-Olympic qualifying heats5 5 With this
court order, Reynolds planned to run in the Bruce Jenner Classic
in San Jose, California. Nonetheless, the director of the race with-
drew Reynolds' invitation due to pressure from the IAAF, includ-
ing the IAAF's threat to invoke the "contamination rule." 56 On
June 6, 1992, Reynolds ran in a San Francisco meet to qualify for
the U.S. Olympic Trials, and once again the IAAF reiterated its
position.5 7 This time, however, the IAAF barred the seven runners
who competed against Reynolds from future IAAF competitions
based on its contamination rule.5 8 TAC was caught in the contro-
versy between the IAAF rules and federal court decisions.5 9
Reynolds' next step was to run in the Olympic Trials in New
Orleans to qualify for the Olympics. The only legal precedent was
discouraging.6° A London court had previously rejected a similar
appeal against the IAAF brought by Sandra Glasser, a Swiss mid-
dle distance runner.61 Nonetheless, on June 8, 1992, federal district
court Judge Joseph Kinneary converted a ten-day temporary re-
straining order into a preliminary injunction enjoining TAC and
the IAAF from "commencing or prosecuting in any other forum
any action with regard to, affecting or in any way involving [Reyn-
olds'] participation in any or all international and national amateur
track and field competition including, without limitation the 1992
54. Reynolds I, supra note 11.
55. Judge Says Reynolds Can Run, Crn. TRIB., May 29, 1992, at C3. A USOC spokes-
man said, however, that a court could not get Reynolds into the Olympic Games. "The
IAAF controls, not the USOC and not a court." Id.
56. Reynolds Vows To Continue Fight, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 1992.
57. Hersh, supra note 8.
58. See Christine Brennan, IAAF Says No Way to Reynolds; 7 Saturday Opponents
Declared Ineligible, WASH. POST, June 10, 1992, at C1.
59. Id.
60. John Mehaffey, Reynolds Considers Immediate Legal Action To Overturn Ban,
REUTERS, May 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
61. Gasser v. Stinson, Q.B., June 15, 1988, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, UK-
CASE File (official record unavailable) (trial for declaratory relief, damages, and injunc-
tive relief stemming from Gasser's disqualification for a positive drug test before the 1988
Summer Olympics). See also Mehaffey, supra note 60.
1994] 545
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U.S. Olympic Trials and the 1992 Summer Olympic Games." 62
Judge Kinneary issued the injunction because, if Reynolds were de-
nied the chance of running in the trials, he would suffer irreparable
harm.63
Although this temporary restraining order permitted Reyn-
olds to compete in the Olympic Trials, the court also issued a per-
manent injunction.64 The following day, the U.S. Supreme Court
heard Reynolds' case. Thus, Reynolds' appeals lasted twenty-two
months, interfered with his training, and cost him thousands of dol-
lars.65 The case not only challenged the credibility of the IAAF's
drug-testing procedures, but also served to characterize the IAAF
as a dictatorial body.
III. THE REYNOLDS CASES
A. The District Court Allows Reynolds To Run in the Trials
On June 19, 1992, one day before the Olympic trials were to
begin, U.S. district court Judge Kinneary converted the preliminary
injunction against the IAAF and TAC into a permanent injunc-
tion.66 The IAAF did not appear at any of these hearings or at the
instant case because, as it informed Reynolds by letter, it did not
believe a U.S. court had personal jurisdiction over it.67
After discussing the events leading up to the case, the court
found that it had personal jurisdiction over the IAAF.68 As plain-
tiff, Reynolds had the burden of proving personal jurisdiction;
however, Reynolds only needed to make a prima facie case, as the
district court determined the issue on the basis of written materials
and not oral argument.69 Because the IAAF was a non-resident
defendant in a diversity case, the court stated that the IAAF "must
be amenable to suit under the forum state's long-arm statute and
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must not violate the
Due Process clause of the United States Constitution. ' 70 The dis-
62. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C-2-92-452, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8383 (E.D. Ohio June 19, 1992).
63. Id.
64. Reynolds I, supra note 11.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *18.
69. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *8.
70. Id. at *9. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
546 [Vol. 16:537
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trict court found that Reynolds' alleged jurisdictional facts were
sufficient to make out a prima facie case based on the IAAF's
"transact[ing] business" 71 in Ohio and the "tortious activity provi-
sions of the Ohio long-arm statute.
'72
Furthermore, the court found that the IAAF had minimum
contacts with Ohio under the test articulated in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,73 and that it, therefore, was subject to personal
jurisdiction.74 The court quoted a letter from the IAAF President
to TAC's President, in which the IAAF stated that even if "the
American guarantee of individual rights overlaps with [TAC's]
duty to follow [the IAAF] rules," the TAC President still must do
"everything possible ... within the framework of the IAAF consti-
tution" to conclude this case "in [the] name of the entire world
athletics movement. ' 75 In response, the court stated:
Initially the court must sharply reject the IAAF and TAC's posi-
tion that the IAAF is not subject to the jurisdiction of any court
anywhere in the world.... Apparently the IAAF takes the posi-
tion that to accord athletes the individual rights the United
States has always accorded its own citizens is inconsistent with
the rules of the IAAF. ... It is simply an unacceptable position
that courts of this country cannot protect the individual rights of
United States citizens where those rights are threatened by an
association which has significant contacts with this country,
which exercises significant control over both athletes and ath-
letic events in this country, which acts through an agent in this
country, and which gains significant revenue from its contacts
with United States companies.76
Thus, the court found that it had personal jurisdiction over the
IAAF because the IAAF had minimum contacts with Ohio, and
that, as it failed to object to personal jurisdiction, the IAAF waived
its right to contest it.77
The court then discussed the issue of the preliminary injunc-
tion. Judge Kinneary determined that the irreparable harm to
Reynolds' career that would result if he were not allowed to com-
pete in the Olympic Trials outweighed the possibility of the IAAF's
71. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *13.
72. Id. at *15.
73. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
74. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *18.
75. Id. at *19.
76. Id. at *18-*20 (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at *25-*26.
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suspending other athletes. 78 In the Sixth Circuit, an injunction may
be granted when the plaintiff establishes: "(1) the likelihood of the
plaintiff's success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will
save the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether the injunc-
tion would harm others; and (4) whether the public interest would
be served by the injunction." 79 Using the balancing test and weigh-
ing most heavily the irreparable injury prong8o against the harm to
others prong, the court focused on the IAAF's threat of contami-
nation to other athletes running with Reynolds.8' Finding the
threat "unconvincing," the court did not consider weighing it
against the harm to Reynolds.82 The court stated that it found "the
IAAF rule underlying the threat to be a grossly unsavory method
of enforcing its anti-doping rules."8 3 Also, the harm to Reynolds,
were he prevented from competing in the Olympic Trials, would be
significant.84 Thus, Judge Kinneary determined that the irrepara-
ble harm to Reynolds' career that would result were he not allowed
to compete in the Olympic Trials outweighed the possibility of the
IAAF's suspending other athletes.8 5 Finally, the court found that
Reynolds had a good chance of winning on the merits. 86 There-
fore, it issued a permanent injunction against the IAAF and TAC
from interfering with Reynolds' running in the Olympic Trials and
from the IAAF's contaminating the other runners. 87
An attorney for TAC planned to file an emergency appeal
with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to stay the district court
78. Id. at *28-*30.
79. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *26, citing International Longshoremen's Ass'n Lo-
cal 1937 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 927 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63
(1991). The four factors are not prerequisites, but elements to balance in relation to each
other "with no single element being dispositive." Id. at *27, citing In re DeLorean Motor
Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at *33.
81. Id. at *26.
82. Id. at *28. The threat was unconvincing because it was not clear to the court that
the "IAAF's contamination rule is mandatory in nature." Id. at *29. See also supra text
accompanying notes 42-44. Furthermore, the court did not believe the IAAF would pro-
hibit top "United States track and field athletes uninvolved in this litigation from partici-
pating in the Olympics on the basis of Rule 53(ii) alone." Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *29.
83. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *30.
84. Id. at *33.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *32.
87. Id. at *34-*35.
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order.88 Meanwhile, athletes set to compete in the four-hundred
meter race did not know whether they would compete against
Butch Reynolds and face a ban from the IAAF.89
B. The Court of Appeals Reinstates the Ban
Later that afternoon, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Eugene Siler 9° stayed the injunction that the district court had is-
sued hours earlier.91 In a much shorter opinion than the twenty-six
page opinion issued by Judge Kinneary, Judge Siler held that Reyn-
olds would suffer irreparable harm if he is not allowed to compete
in the Olympic Trials, but that the harm did not extend beyond the
Trials because the court questioned its power to force the IAAF to
allow Reynolds into the Olympics. 92 Furthermore, the appellate
court found that the IAAF could act on its contamination threat,
which would cause harm to the other athletes in the Trials.93 Fi-
nally, the appellate court stayed the injunction because it did not
believe Reynolds showed that he could succeed on the merits.
94
Thus, Reynolds was out of the races again. The Sixth Circuit did
not address the issue of jurisdiction over the IAAF.
With the heats for the four-hundred meters set for 2:45 p.m.
on Saturday, June 20, 1992, and the IAAF contamination threat
88. Judge Rules Reynolds Can Run in Trials, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 19, 1992, at
H3. The permanent injunction put TAC in the position of either violating a U.S. court
order or causing the IAAF to issue sanctions against other runners. Id.
89. See id.
90. Judge Siler stated that he was a member of TAC and that, if either party objected,
that party could request another judge. Neither objected, however. Reynolds , supra
note 12, at *1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. The factors that must be weighed for granting a preliminary injunction and for
granting a stay are identical. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. "[T]he flexibility
traditionally afforded examination of the foregoing factors is tempered by the need to ana-
lyze carefully the dynamics of the injury claimed by each of the parties in the case." Reyn-
olds I, supra note 11, at *28, citing Schalk v. Teledyne, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (citing Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 103
(6th Cir. 1982)). It appears that the appellate court gave more weight to the harm to others
prong and the potential for success on the merits prong than the district court did. The
appellate court concentrated not so much on the harm to Reynolds, but on the public
interest, the threat to the other athletes, and the possibility of success on the merits. Reyn-
olds II, supra note 12, at *3-*4. While these factors are to be considered in the balancing
test of whether to issue the stay, the harm to the plaintiff is an equally, if not more, impor-
tant aspect of the test.
94. Reynolds II, supra note 12, at *4. The Sixth Circuit also recognized that "[tihe
rules of the bodies [the IAAF and TAC] do not allow for an appeal to a court." Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
still in effect, Reynolds sought relief from the stay from Justice
John Paul Stevens, Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, on Saturday
morning.95 The races were postponed first until 5:00 p.m. Saturday,
then to Sunday, leaving the other runners in a quandary as to when
they would race and, therefore, upsetting their training schedules. 96
C. The Supreme Court Lets Reynolds Out of the Starting Blocks
Justice Stevens granted Reynolds' application and lifted the
Sixth Circuit stay of the injunction.97 Justice Stevens focused, as
district court Judge Kinneary had, on the IAAF threat. He held:
"[T]he IAAF's threatened harm to third parties cannot dictate the
proper disposition of [Reynolds'] claim."98 He stated that the dis-
trict court persuasively found that Reynolds had a good chance of
success on the merits. Furthermore, Justice Stevens held that dam-
ages were no replacement for the value of the opportunity to win a
gold medal at the Olympics. 99 Justice Stevens concluded that a
legal remedy of damages is not an "adequate substitute for the in-
tangible values for which the world's greatest athletes compete." 1°°
TAC then asked the full Court to review Justice Stevens' or-
der. Saturday night, the full Court issued a one-sentence order:
"The motion of The Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., Inc. to va-
cate the stay entered by Justice Stevens is denied." 101
D. The IAAF's Reaction to the Supreme Court's Decision
The IAAF responded to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling by
reiterating that the contamination rule was still in effect. 02 The
95. John Jeansonne, Trials & Tribulations; Top Court Wades into Butchgate, NEws-
DAY, June 21, 1992, at 2.
96. Id.
97. Reynolds III, supra note 13, at 2513.
98. Id. "The IAAF's threat to enforce its eligibility decision-no matter how arbi-
trary or erroneous it may be-by punishing innocent third parties cannot be permitted to
influence a fair and impartial adjudication of the merits of applicant's claims." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 120 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1992)
(mem.). "The decision by the Supreme Court to let Stevens' ruling stand is a landmark in
the high court's history .... Never before had the court made a decision affecting Olympic
competition. It is a precedent that concerns the [USOC]." Julie Cart, Supreme Court
Backs Reynolds, L.A. TIMEs, June 21, 1992, at C1.
102. See Supreme Court Justice Allows Reynolds To Compete, REUTERS, June 20, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
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runners voted, and thirty of the thirty-two, all except Reynolds and
his brother, Jeff Reynolds, decided not to run.0 3
The IAAF changed its position on Sunday when the IAAF
President, Primo Nebiolo, asked the IAAF Council to waive its
contamination rule for these trials only.O4 On Monday, June 22,
the IAAF issued a statement waiving the contamination rule to
"support and protect the best interests of its athletes and their pos-
sibility to qualify for the Olympic Games in Barcelona," and al-
lowed Reynolds to run.105 The IAAF made clear that the
exception was for this race only, which was now set for Thesday,
June 23, 1992.106
When the dust settled, Reynolds placed only fifth in the finals
and earned himself a place on the U.S. Olympic Team as an alter-
nate.10 7 Basically, the issue of whether he could compete in the
Olympics was moot, as he failed to qualify as a starter, although it
was questionable whether he would be allowed in the Olympic Vil-
lage and whether his name would be submitted to the IOC as a
member of the U.S. Olympic Team. The IAAF had to have the last
word, however, and extended Reynolds' suspension until Decem-
ber 31, 1992, as "'a message' to athletes challenging its rulings."'10 8
Reynolds' lawsuit for damages against the IAAF was decided on
December 4, 1992.109 He won 27.3 million dollars. 110
103. Michael Janofsky, Olympics; Supreme Court Clears the Lane for Reynolds, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 21, 1992, at B1.
104. IAAF Makes Exception, Reynolds Can Race, REUTERS, June 23, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Phil Hersh, Reynolds' Bid Ends-in 5th, CHi. TRIB., June 27, 1992, at C1.
108. Dick Patrick, Reynolds' Ban Extended, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 1992, at Cl. This
IAAF "action was based on IAAF Rule 53.1 (VIII) that forbids athletes from conduct
which in the opinion of the IAAF Council is considered to be insulting or improper or
likely to bring the sport into disrepute." IAAF Extends Suspension of Reynolds Until Dec.
31, NEWSDAY, Aug. 11, 1992, at 116.
109. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C2-92-452 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 3, 1992). Judge Kinneary stated that "the record in this case established that the
IAAF has purposefully avoided the truth, if for no other reason than its desire to protect
the credibility of its drug-testing facilities at the personal expense of Mr. Reynolds." Id. at
23-24. The court granted Reynolds a default judgment against the IAAF for breach of
contract, breach of contractual due process, defamation, and tortious interference with
business relations. Id. at 29-30. The court also granted Reynolds a permanent injunction
and declared that the suspension imposed on Reynolds was void. Id. at 30-32.
110. The IAAF owes Reynolds $6,839,002 in compensatory damages and $20,517,006
in punitive damages for a total of $27,356,008. Id. at 30.
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E. Critique of the Procedural Aspects of Reynolds
Rarely does a case progress as quickly through the federal
court system as did Reynolds. Like a death penalty case, how-
ever,111 time constrained the courts. The courts should be com-
mended for acting quickly and efficiently. Justice Stevens correctly
decided that the harm to Reynolds, if he were unable to compete in
the trials, outweighed the harm to the IAAF. Reynolds' failure to
qualify mooted the issue of whether he would compete in the
Olympics, but the issue of jurisdiction over the IAAF continued to
be critical for the IAAF because of the potential for similar inci-
dents with other athletes. Justice Stevens also stated that if Reyn-
olds were to qualify, his eligibility could be resolved before the
final event at the Olympics. 112 Furthermore, his focus on the threat
of contamination to the other runners was important. The tactics
the IAAF uses to "contaminate," or to compel other "clean" ath-
letes not to run against athletes who are alleged to use drugs, are
compelling to other runners because, unless they comply, they will
not be able to compete in later events. These tactics, however, put
elite athletes in jeopardy for occurrences beyond their control.
Although athletes may or may not choose to run, they have no
control over a fellow drug-tainted runner's desire to compete in
spite of a positive drug test. Also, the threat of contamination is
not always strictly enforced. Additionally, if the IAAF chose to
enforce its threat in this case, many of the world's top runners
would have been unable to participate in the Barcelona Olympics.
Thus, Justice Stevens properly weighed the harm to Reynolds
against the harm to third parties in granting the injunction.
Whatever basis the Supreme Court had for jurisdiction over
the IAAF was not decided in Reynolds. Although Justice Stevens
did not explicitly discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the IAAF,
such jurisdiction is implicit in his address of the appeal. The district
court properly found jurisdiction over the IAAF through either
TAC as its NF, or through the state's long-arm statute. The IAAF
transacted business with Reynolds through TAC, its agent. The
IAAF delegated to TAC "the duties of notifying [Reynolds] that
111. A lawyer for TAC stated that "[t]his is being litigated like a death penalty case."
Statement of Doriane Lambelet, reprinted in Jay Weiner, Appeals Court Denies Reynolds
Berth in Olympic Trials, STAR TRiB., June 20, 1992, at C7.
112. Reynolds III, supra note 13, 112 S. Ct. at 2513. Justice Stevens did not explain
how this matter would be resolved.
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the IAAF suspended him..., of conducting a hearing and of in-
vestigating the matter further. ' 113 The IAAF meets the Interna-
tional Shoe minimum contacts test with each state because of its
relationship to its representative, TAC. Whether the finding would
have been different had the IAAF contested jurisdiction cannot be
ascertained. Nonetheless, the courts' efficient handling of Reyn-
olds and their finding jurisdiction are exemplary of how U.S. courts
may treat similar situations. Even if the IAAF does not agree with
how the courts treated Reynolds, if it does not want duplicate liti-
gation in all of its member countries, the IAAF needs to make
changes.
IV. TREATMENT OF OTHER ATHLETES
While Butch Reynolds succeeded in his attempt to obtain a
U.S. court order to compete over IAAF protests, he did not suc-
ceed in convincing the IAAF to overturn its decision. Other ath-
letes, however, such as German runner Katrin Krabbe, did have
bans overturned on technicalities.1 4 Katrin Krabbe, Silke Moeller,
and Grit Breuer, three "clean" German runners, allegedly manipu-
lated their urine samples, which were all found to have come from
the same person.1 15 In these German athletes' cases, the IAAF
lifted the suspensions because it found that the German NF of the
IAAF, the German Athletic Federation ("DLV"), "has no provi-
sion either for out-of-competition testing, or for a proper penalty
procedure for an athlete who tests positive, even during competi-
tion."1 6 Unlike Reynolds who took his test, these athletes appar-
ently manipulated their tests. In its decision to ban an athlete, an
athlete's own manipulation of test procedures or results should be
of greater concern to the IAAF than a laboratory's mistake. More-
over, the DLV, the governing body for these runners, rejected its
own panel's decision to lift the suspensions and appealed to the
IAAF.1 7 In contrast, TAC supported its panel's lifting of Reyn-
113. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *12.
114. The IAAF lifted a four-year ban on Katrin Krabbe, Silke Moeller, and Grit
Breuer before the Olympics. Timothy Heritage, Watts Wins 400 Metres, Drugs Cast
Shadow over the Olympics, REUTERS, Aug. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuter File.
115. John Goodbody, Testing Is Put to the Test by Krabbe, THE TIMES (London), June
30, 1992.
116. Id.
117. Randy Harvey, Krabbe, Two Teammates Cleared for Olympics, L.A. TiMEs, June
29, 1992, at C10.
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olds' suspension and backed him in his appeal to the IAAF.118
Furthermore, the IAAF took two days to hear these three German
athletes' claims, compared to the two hours for Reynolds.119 The
IAAF should have decided Reynolds' case in favor of Reynolds, as
it did Krabbe's, Moeller's, and Breuer's cases, because all four
samples had procedural problems in testing, whether or not any of
these athletes actually used the prohibited substances. Although
the factors underlying these cases were similar, the decisions of the
IAAF were not. These inconsistent decisions make it difficult for
an athlete to anticipate how the IAAF will react to a positive test.
The IAAF also lifted U.S. shot-putter James Doehring's sus-
pension because of "major irregularities in the handling of a sec-
ond urine specimen by the laboratory concerned." 20 Thus, unlike
Reynolds, Doehring got off on a technicality. Like the DLV in
Krabbe's case, TAC upheld Doehring's suspension, which the
IAAF overruled.' 21 Nevertheless, like Reynolds' case, the AAA
decided that Doehring's suspension should be lifted, a decision
with which the IAAF agreed. 22
Randy Barnes, a U.S. shot-put world record holder, did not
share Reynolds' success in the U.S. court system. The IAAF up-
held Barnes' suspension for his positive test of the steroid
methyltestosterone after a track and field meet in Sweden in
1990,123 despite Barnes' claim that improper drug-testing proce-
dures were used.124 A West Virginia court ruled that Barnes must
be allowed to compete at the Olympic Trials.125 The court found
jurisdiction over the IAAF and TAC because "both sanction events
in the state and 'therefore are considered to be present and operat-
ing in the state.' "126 Once again, neither the IAAF nor TAC were
118. See supra text accompanying note 47.
119. Id.
120. Krabbe Affair Goes to Arbitration, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 1992.
121. Jim Byers, Suspended Germans' Fate Decided Soon, TORONTO STAR, June 1, 1992,
at D6.
122. Id.
123. Julie Cart, Barnes Says Drug Test Mishandled, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at C1.
124. Julie Cart, Barnes Stays Out of Trials, L.A. TIMEs, June 26, 1992, at C4.
125. Barnes v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 92C-2640 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.
June 22, 1992). Because there were "serious and substantial defects" in the IAAF drug-
testing procedures, Judge Paul Zakaib, Jr. ruled that Barnes must be allowed to compete.
Judge: Barnes Gets His Shot, L.A. Tinvms, June 23, 1992, at C1. The court permanently
enjoined the IAAF and TAC from interfering with Barnes' participation in the Olympic
Games. Barnes, No. 92C-2640.
126. Judge: Barnes Gets His Shot, supra note 125.
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present at the hearing.127 Nevertheless, TAC removed the suit to
U.S. district court based on diversity jurisdiction. 128 The district
court dissolved the restraining order, finding that Barnes had not
exhausted his administrative remedies 29 and that his claim, there-
fore, was not ripe for litigation.
Comparison of Krabbe's, Doehring's, and Barnes' cases to
Reynolds' case shows too many discrepancies between the IAAF's
written standards and procedures and their actual implementation.
An athlete cannot be expected to know if a laboratory will handle
her sample properly, which steps to take in the appeals process,
and the rules of the IAAF or her NF. Until the IAAF resolves
these dilemmas, athletes will be at a severe disadvantage. Resolu-
tion of these discrepancies would aid the IAAF in deterring ath-
letes from using performance-enhancing drugs.
V. JURISDICTION OVER THE IAAF
A. Jurisdictional Issues
Reynolds raises an issue that has not previously been decided:
IAAF's amenability to suit in its member nations. The IAAF be-
lieves that it is not amenable to suit anywhere, and it has stated
that it will never accept a decision of any court in the world against
its rules.130 The IAAF position, however, does not leave much
room for athletes' legal rights.
First, U.S. courts have decided that the IAAF is amenable to
suit.' 3 ' The Reynolds I court even went so far as to say that, "as the
IAAF acts through its [NFs], it is reasonable to subject the IAAF
to jurisdiction anywhere its member organizations may be subject
to suit."'132 This decision, however, is antithetical to the IAAF's
own conclusions. 133
127. Id.
128. Barnes v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 2:92-0603 (S.D.W. Va. June
25, 1992), dismissed, Sept. 30, 1993.
129. Id., slip op. at 16.
130. See Harvey, supra note 14.
131. Reynolds I, supra note 11; Barnes, No. 92C-2640 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 22, 1992).
132. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *21-*22. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 744
F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that an international organization which acts through its
members may be subject to personal jurisdiction based upon a member's contacts with, and
activity in, the forum).
133. "The IAAF says it can't relinquish its anti-drug efforts to the court systems of the
more than 200 nations that make up its membership" because clean runners will not be
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Because the IOC oversees the IAAF, and the IOC has been
called into various nations' courts,134 there is a strong argument
that the IAAF is likewise amenable to suit. Nevertheless, in find-
ing that they do not have jurisdiction over the IOC, some courts
have deferred to Rule 1 of the Olympic Charter, which aims "to
spread Olympic principles."'1 35 Also, Rule 16 of the Olympic Char-
ter gives the IOC "Supreme Jurisdiction," and states that "[i]t shall
be the interpreter of the Rules."' 136 Furthermore, Rule 23 states
that the IOC is "the final authority on all questions concerning the
Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement.' 37 Thus, the IAAF
has a strong point that it is not amenable to suit anywhere and that
it is the final authority on all its decisions, like the IOC. Neverthe-
less, if the IAAF acts on its own authority in an unchecked, dicta-
torial manner, then it is not really spreading "Olympic principles,"
but doing individuals injustice by depriving them of their rights.
Furthermore, because the IAAF is not as powerful as the IOC,
plaintiffs like Reynolds have a better chance that a court will find
the IAAF subject to U.S. jurisdiction, especially when an athletic
event takes place in the United States. The IAAF is therefore con-
cerned because any U.S. court decision may be enforced on U.S.
soil during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, unlike in Barcelona, had
Reynolds qualified for a starting position.
As long as the IAAF is amenable to suit in the United States
or other countries, there will be conflicts between international
rules and an individual nation's laws concerning the eligibility of
athletes.138 TAC must abide by the laws of its government, but it
completely protected. David Greifinger, 31 Competitors Shouldn't Be Denied Chance To
Follow Dreams, USA TODAY, June 23, 1992, at 10C.
134. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S.
522 (1987). Also, the Taiwanese NOC brought an action "against the IOC in the courts of
Switzerland, where the IOC is chartered." NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 95. "A 1977 Bel-
gian court decision, confirming a position taken by French Courts, as well as the Council of
Europe and the High Court of Justice of the European Communities, have established that
the international rules of sport supersede conflicting national policies and laws in particular
contexts." Id. at 34.
135. OLYMWIC CHARTER rule 1, reprinted in NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 233.
136. Id. rule 16, at 235.
137. Id. rule 23, at 235.
138. See Goodbody, supra note 115 (discussing DLV's lack of rules on out-of-competi-
tion testing and penalty procedure). Also, there is a difference between the appeal proce-
dures under IAAF rules and under U.S. law. Under IAAF rules, one is first suspended,
then there is a hearing, then an athlete may be ruled ineligible. Under the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978, however, an athlete has the right to appeal before any ruling of ineligibility.
36 U.S.C. § 395(c).
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must also follow the IAAF rules. 139 If there are inconsistencies, a
NF may not know which rule to follow. The IAAF would prefer
international sports law to supersede each member country's own
law. Unfortunately, this position is too idealistic in this day and
age when politics and sports are inextricably intertwined. 14
Because a court may find that it has jurisdiction over the
IAAF, banned athletes may resort to litigation, and the cost to
both the athlete and the IAAF may be tremendous. Furthermore,
sanctions against drug users will be dissolved out of the fear that
the athlete will challenge the sanction in a court anywhere in the
world. 141 The Dubin Commission of Canada recommended after
the Ben Johnson incident in Seoul
that decisions on eligibility for competition remain a function of
the sport-governing bodies themselves. While the federal gov-
ernment can and should reserve the right to determine what in-
dividuals and bodies receive government funding, it is not
appropriate for the Government of Canada to determine who is
eligible to compete in either domestic or international
competition.142
Therefore, other forums should be available for an athlete to
contest a positive drug test because it is unfair for the IAAF to be
the final arbitrator in these situations, especially when the IAAF's
enforcement record is inconsistent. The IAAF has not proven to
be a neutral arbitrator in the past. It would, however, be unwork-
able for every member nation to have jurisdiction over the IAAF.
Forcing the IAAF into any court where it operated would eventu-
ally destroy it.143 The IAAF would be wise to choose a neutral
139. The USOC President Harvey Schiller stated after the Supreme Court decision in
Reynolds that "[w]e've got to be careful that we don't allow the selection of our Olympic
team by court order." Cart, supra note 101.
140. For example, the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the U.S.S.R.
boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics showed that political ideas mixed with sports
are detrimental to Olympic principles. See NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 4, 50, 101-37.
141. A Battle Far from Won, INDEPENDENT, July 31, 1992, at 16.
142. DUBIN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 532. "[lIt is urged that all athletes who have
been subjected to disciplinary action should be afforded the right of appeal in accordance
with the principles of natural justice." Id. at 498.
143. An IAAF spokesman asked: "What would happen if the jurisdictions of all 200
member federations challenged the IAAF's ruling? [The Reynolds decision] is a decision
that may lead to chaos." Michael Wilbon, IAAF Takes Gold in Olympic Absurdity, WASH.
POST, June 20, 1992, at G1.
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forum for an athlete to appeal his or her case. 144 The IAAF must
not have the final word on everything as it currently does.
B. Jurisdictional Solutions
There are several solutions available for the current problem.
Disputes between the IAAF and individual athletes could be
brought to the following forums: the Court for Arbitration of
Sport, the International Court of Justice, or the International
Olympic Committee. While the IAAF would like each athlete to
relinquish his or her right to dispute an IAAF finding, the best
solution is to have an independent arbitrator.
1. Independent Arbitrator
One possibility for an independent forum for cases like Reyn-
olds' is the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"). 145 The Inter-
national Olympic Committee, in 1983, created the CAS to provide
for dispute resolution.146 The IOC, the IOC President, the IFs, and
the NOCs each appoint fifteen jurists' 47 with legal training and
competence in the field of sport to sit on the CAS.' 48 The CAS is
intended to settle nontechnical disputes "of a private nature arising
out of the practice or development of sport," and generally, "all
activities pertaining to sport and whose settlement is not otherwise
provided for in the Olympic Charter."'1 49
Article 11 of the Statute of the CAS provides that, "[flor each
case, the CAS sits in the composition of a panel consisting of one
or three arbitrators mandatorily chosen from among its mem-
bers.' 150 After each of the parties appoints one arbitrator, the two
parties come to an agreement as to the appointment of the third
arbitrator.'a 1 If they cannot agree, the President of the Federal Tri-
144. "The national and international bodies must work together to set world-wide
drug-testing standards, jurisdiction and resolution procedures." Frank Greenberg,
Supreme Court Ruling Forbids Ban from Trials, USA TODAY, June 23, 1992, at Clo.
145. See TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL DU SPORT (TAS) (1991).
146. Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport art. 1 (1983), as amended 1990, in
TRIBUNAL ARBrrRAL DU SPORT, supra note 145, at 45 [hereinafter Statute of the CAS].
See NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 35.
147. Statute of the CAS, supra note 146, art. 7.
148. Id. art. 6; see NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 36.
149. Statute of the CAS, supra note 146, art. 4 (emphasis added); see NAFZIGER, supra
note 6, at 36.
150. Statute of the CAS, supra note 146, art. 11.
151. Id. art. 12.
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bunal of the Swiss Confederation appoints the third member of the
panel. 152 If there is only one arbitrator, the parties mutually agree
on the arbitrator and nominate him.
153
The parties bringing the dispute to the CAS "sign an arbitra-
tion agreement in which they agree to submit their dispute to the
arbitration of the CAS."'1 54 This means that the two parties have to
agree to allow the CAS to hear the case; thus, the jurisdiction is
optional because if one of the parties does not agree to submit to
the jurisdiction of the CAS, the CAS cannot hear the dispute.
Although CAS jurisdiction is optional, it can convene anywhere in
the world, 155 and, once a party submits to its jurisdiction, the deci-
sion is binding. Both IFs and "any natural person or corporate
body having the capacity or power to compromise" have standing
to bring a dispute to the GAS.' 56 Although many of the decisions
from the CAS originate from disputes between athletic clubs and
NFs or between a NOC and an athlete: 57 there is no reason the
CAS could not decide a dispute like the one between Reynolds and
the IAAF 5 Nonetheless, an individual athlete may be wary of
taking his or her case to the CAS because of the IFs' jurist appoint-
ment power. Furthermore, the IAAF may feel that it compromises
its jurisdiction if it agrees to a binding decision. Without compro-
mise by both sides, however, disputes over imperfect drug-testing
procedures and results will continue to taint amateur sports.
The CAS statute may only be modified by a proposal by the
Executive Board of the 1OC, and only if two-thirds of the IOC
session approves the amendment. 59 Thus, it may be difficult for
the CAS to change its statute to remove the jurist appointment
power from the IFs. Amending the CAS statute is an important
step that would make the drug-testing appeals process fairer. The
CAS is relatively easy to convene and is more impartial than the
current IAAF panel appeals process. The only drawbacks are that
the statute itself has to be modified to remove the jurist appoint-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. art. 19.
155. Id. art. 2; see NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 36.
156. Statute of the CAS, supra note 146, art. 5; see NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 36.
157. NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 37.
158. The CAS issued an "advisory opinion for the benefit of the Norwegian Olympic
Committee in which it upheld the right of an NOC to exclude an athlete for life if he or she
has violated anti-doping rules within the IOC framework." Id.
159. Statute of the CAS, supra note 146, art. 75.
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ment power from the IFs, and that this body may not want to be
involved with numerous drug-testing disputes. The advantages of
impartiality and uniformity outweigh the drawbacks, however, and
the modified CAS is the best solution to the Reynolds type of
problem.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), sometimes re-
ferred to as the World Court, is another possible independent arbi-
trator.160 The only parties allowed to bring disputes to the ICJ,
however, are states. 161 Nonetheless, a nation may take up an indi-
vidual's claim and make an international claim on his or her behalf
at the ICJ.162 Thus, the United States could advocate Reynolds'
claim against the IAAF.163 As for the IAAF, an international or-
ganization, it is questionable whether the ICJ would have jurisdic-
tion over the IAAF if the IAAF makes a claim on its own behalf.
The ICJ may render advisory opinions on disputes between a state
and an international organization, 164 so perhaps the ICJ would
grant jurisdiction to the IOC for the IAAF. The United States and
the IOC could then dispute Reynolds' claim against the IAAF in
the ICJ. Because it is doubtful that the World Court would want to
be burdened with trivial questions concerning sports, this proposal
may not be a likely solution.
Like the CAS, ICJ jurisdiction is optional. 165 Once each party
consents to jurisdiction, the decision is binding only between the
two parties.166 Hence, although Reynolds and the IAAF could set-
tle their dispute, any decision concerning IAAF procedures will
not be binding, and the IAAF, therefore, need not follow the deci-
sion in future disputes. Furthermore, there is also a problem of
enforcement if only an advisory opinion is handed down.167 Unlike
the decisions of the CAS, if the outcome is against the IAAF in the
ICJ, it may be more difficult to enforce the decision to allow an
160. Reynolds' agent, Brad Hunt, stated that the World Court might be a possibility for
appeal while Reynolds waited for the federal courts' decisions. Mike Rowbottom, Athlet-
ics: World Threat from Reynolds, INDEPENDENT, June 23, 1992, at 28.
161. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 82
(1988).
162. Id. at 82-83.
163. The U.S. Government, however, may not want to engage in this tinkering with the
Olympics.
164. ROSENNE, supra note 161, at 83.
165. Id. at 82-92.
166. Id. at 144-45.
167. Id. at 107.
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individual athlete to run if he or she participates on foreign soil.
Thus, the CAS may be a better forum than the ICJ, because the
CAS is more tightly connected with the IOC and the IOC could
force the IAAF to comply with the decision through its recognition
and non-recognition policies.168
One possible solution that the IAAF would probably favor
would be an appeal to the IOC. This is preferable to the IAAF, as
the IOC is the interpreter of its own rules and has "final authority"
over all decisions affecting the Olympics. 169 When it was uncertain
whether Reynolds would win at the trials, the executive director of
the USOC, Harvey Schiller, stated that, "'depending on the cir-
cumstances' the USOC would ask the IOC, as final authority to
rule on the case. ' 170 Because Reynolds only placed as an alternate,
and the IOC did not rule on the case, the IOC had no cause to
decide Reynolds' case.
If the IFs do not have the power to appoint the CAS jurists,
the best forum for an athlete's claim is an independent arbitrator,
such as the CAS. The jurist appointment power needs to be re-
moved from the IFs, the bodies which impose the penalties, for an
athlete to obtain an impartial final appeal. An IF might also favor
the CAS because it is under the auspices of the IOC. The CAS is
the best arbitrator to hear these claims because it can convene any-
where. There is, however, the problem of optional jurisdiction. If
the IAAF, TAC, other NFs, and individual athletes do agree to
submit to the jurisdiction of one of these arbitrators, the CAS
would be the best forum, especially if jurist appointments were re-
structured so that the IFs did not appoint any jurists.
2. IAAF's Solution: Each Athlete Agrees To Submit to
IAAF Rules
Nebiolo's solution is to require all athletes to sign an agree-
ment relinquishing "their rights to seek court action as a condition
of eligibility."17' While it is difficult to imagine an American ath-
lete agreeing to this requirement and effectively giving up his or
168. The IOC can withdraw recognition of an IF if it does not comply with the Olympic
Charter. NAFZIGER, supra note 6, at 28.
169. See supra notes 136-37.
170. Michael Janofsky, Olympics; Reynolds Advances in Legal Rat Race, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1992, at B19.
171. Michael Janofsky, Barcelona: Track & Field; On Your Mark, Get Set; Go Home:
It's Drugs, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at B14.
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her right to sue the IAAF in court, as Reynolds established, Nebi-
olo believes it is "critical to the success of the competition and use-
ful as an indirect way of discouraging others from using drugs."'172
One reason the IAAF President wants this requirement for all
track and field athletes is that the IAAF fears the ramifications of
U.S. court decisions for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. The IAAF
would have no authority to block enforcement of decisions al-
lowing a banned athlete to participate. 173 As Reynolds proved,
however, Nebiolo's proposal is an unworkable solution, for the
IAAF is not a neutral forum where athletes are insured fair treat-
ment if there is a problem with drug-test results. 174 Such a waiver
would be palatable only if the IAAF has adequate and consistent
procedures to protect athletes against technical mistakes in drug
testing.
3. Other Solutions
Individual NF's constitutions could be made more uniform.
For example, Krabbe, Moeller, and Breuer had their bans lifted
because of a technicality in the DLV constitution. 175 If every con-
stitution were more like the IAAF's, i.e., stricter, or the same or
very similar to all the other NFs, there would be fewer opportuni-
ties for an athlete to challenge the system on a claim of inconsis-
tency. If the standards were equal between the NFs and the IAAF,
fewer athletes would take their cases to court.176 Otherwise,
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Reynolds I court concluded that the IAAF does not strictly adhere to its own
rules. Reynolds I, supra note 11, at *29. The court made this statement because there was
conflicting evidence as to whether the IAAF suspended Reynolds or declared him ineligi-
ble after the Monte Carlo track meet. According to TAC, Reynolds was merely sus-
pended, while the IAAF contends that Reynolds was ineligible. IAAF Rule 59 states that
"disciplinary proceedings must occur in three stages: suspension, hearing, and ineligibility."
Id. at *2. If a U.S. court makes this type of evaluation about the IAAF, an athlete who
feels his test results were incorrect cannot feel secure in bringing a claim to the IAAF.
175. See Goodbody, supra note 115. Krabbe and two other athletes "escaped suspen-
sion on a technicality because Germany's doping rules were not incorporated directly into
the constitution of the German athletic federation." lain MacLeod, Drugs in Sport: Call
for More Harmony To Prevent Drug Cheats Securing Smaller Bans, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 1, 1992, at 32. Mark Gay, IAAF external counsel, said that "[u]nless ade-
quate constitutional provisions exist to support a system of drug-testing, there is no point
in even starting to. test." Id.
176. When these problems arise, they raise questions about the validity of the testing
and the credibility of the IAAF.
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[e]ven though the athlete is still likely to be banned, if he contin-
ues to protest his innocence and persists in legal action against
governing bodies, there comes a point at which some people
may think he would not be pursuing the matter with such vigour
unless there was something in the claims he was making. 177
Adopting the section of the IAAF constitution on drug-testing
procedures itself or using another set of procedures that the NFs
agree to and adopt verbatim into their own constitutions would
lead to more uniformity. 178 Then, the IAAF would no longer have
to worry about individual athletes challenging IAAF decisions
based on NFs' constitutions. There would only be a slight differ-
ence, or none at all, between the IAAF and the NFs' constitutions
concerning the drug-testing appeals process. The best solution is
for the IAAF to receive input from as many NFs as possible, and
then restructure its rules on procedures and athletes' rights. The
IAAF could then request that each NF adopt these new rules as
part of each NF's constitution. Because this proposal is subject to
passage by a number of diverse bodies, however, this approach is
unwieldy.
The Dubin Commission recommended that all NFs "establish
within their own rules a grievance process through which athletes
may receive a fair hearing from the sport-governing body itself, in-
cluding a mechanism for arbitration by an independent arbitrator
mutually acceptable to the parties.' 79 Although TAC has estab-
lished this process, TAC could take it one step further by making
the proposed CAS, and not the IAAF, the forum for final appeal.
Furthermore, it would be appropriate for all other NFs to imple-
ment this appeals process to promote uniformity.
Another solution is to allow individual athletes to sue the
IAAF in any court. This solution is advantageous because the
IAAF would be on notice to adhere to a uniform drug-testing and
appeals system. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is
that much time and money would be wasted.
177. lain MacLeod, Sports Politics: New Year Starts with Massive Drug Hangover,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 30, 1992, at 25 (statement of Mark Gay, IAAF exter-
nal counsel).
178. This agreement could, in turn, be adopted by the IAAF if it were comprehensive
enough. The IAAF agreement could supersede the present rules, and perhaps include
more rights for athletes.
179. DUBIN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 556.
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The IAAF could also be the final arbitrator, but, as Reynolds
demonstrates, this solution is untenable unless significant changes
are made in the way the IAAF addresses the appeals process.
There must be a change from the present inconsistent system for
the IAAF, NFs, and individual athletes to stop the court challenges
to the procedures. The three groups, perhaps along with the IOC,
need to negotiate a solution that creates a neutral forum where
athletes can bring their grievances. Otherwise, lawyers, and not
the athletes, may as well be on the starting blocks in Atlanta in
1996.
VI. ATHLETES' RIGHTS UNDER THE AMATEUR SPORTS Acr
OF 1978
Reynolds also raises the issue of athletes' rights when they are
tested for performance-enhancing drugs,18° and the ensuing ap-
peals process if the sample tests positive for a banned substance.
In the United States, the Amateur Sports Act of 1978181 guarantees
an athlete "the right to an appeal before any ruling of ineligibil-
ity."182 The "appeal process was built into the Amateur Sports Act
to sanctify the notion of innocent until proven guilty, a backbone
of jurisprudence in the United States, Canada and elsewhere.' ' 18 3
Nonetheless, IAAF rules, promulgated in 1989, mandate an ath-
lete's suspension immediately on the finding of a positive test.18
Instead of an athlete having a right to a hearing "before a pro-
nouncement of guilt and the imposition of any penalty,"'18 5 the
onus is on an athlete to prove his or her innocence, rather than on
the IAAF to prove guilt.186 Deterrence was the driving force be-
hind the promulgation of this rule, but the rule seems contrary to
U.S. notions of due process.
180. Whether there is a procedural due process issue in drug testing is beyond the
scope of this Note. While it is unresolved whether the USOC is a state actor, for purposes
of this Note, the author assumes that TAC and the IAAF are not governmental actors. For
more detailed information on this topic, see Wolff, supra note 4, at 630-37.
181. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 395(c) (1978). The Amateur Sports Act
does not mention a question of judicial review, let alone specifically preclude it. Reynolds
v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C2-92-452 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 1992) (deciding
the damages against the IAAF). For this reason, among others, the court in Reynolds'
damages suit held that it had jurisdiction over the IAAF through TAC.
182. Janofsky, supra note 19.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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The International Olympic Charter states that "[a]ny individ-
ual involved in an alleged doping infraction should have available
to them review and appeal mechanisms. Doping infractions should
be investigated to determine the possible involvement of others be-
yond the athlete . . .and any individual subject to investigation
must have reasonable due process protection." 187  While the
Olympic Charter does not clarify the IAAF rule, it seems to give
athletes more rights than the IAAF's new rule.
There is a conflict between U.S. statutory rights and the IAAF
rules. Under the Amateur Sports Act,188 if an athlete tests positive
for drugs, he or she must be granted a hearing before eligibility can
be determined. 89 Furthermore, conflict arises because TAC must
abide by the IAAF's rules without violating U.S. law.
A. Solution: Provide Athletes with a Hearing Before
Ruling on Eligibility
Before 1989, the IAAF allowed athletes a hearing before sus-
pension. To combat increasing drug use in sports and the techno-
logical advances making drugs more difficult to detect, the IAAF
changed its procedure and switched to suspension before a hearing.
This policy is in direct conflict with the U.S. Amateur Sports Act
and, thus, must be changed. There is no reason to presume an ath-
lete guilty unless drug-testing procedures are one-hundred percent
accurate. Given that the test results are not perfect and that more
athletes are challenging the findings because of the stakes in-
volved,190 the IAAF has two choices.
First, the IAAF should return to the pre-1989 system of hear-
ings before suspensions in order to conform to some of its member
nations' statutorily protected rights. If this change grants athletes
of some countries more rights than their nations already prescribe,
those nations' NFs can follow their more restrictive rules if they so
desire. This solution, however, will conform IAAF rules with U.S.
187. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC CHARTER AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT, supra note 1,
§ 3.7. The Charter also provides that due process mechanisms include "compliance with
written Standard Operating Procedure Guidelines during all phase [sic] of the testing pro-
cess." Id. § 7.1.
188. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 395(c).
189. Id.
190. There are more challenges today because the stakes are higher and the cash
awards are larger. Track and field has more challenges than any other Olympic sport "per-
haps because the potential monetary gain from a medal in track remains by far the great-
est." Phil Hersh, Drugs Still Mystery Olympic Ingredient, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 1992, at C1.
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law and similar countries' laws, and athletes will be less likely to
sue the IAAF based on its decisions. The IAAF will be able to
enforce its drug rules more efficiently, especially if it allows the
athletes an opportunity to be heard along with the results from the
test. Not only will athletes respect the IAAF and its decisions
more if they have an opportunity for a fair hearing prior to depri-
vation of their athletic status, but athletes will be less likely to chal-
lenge IAAF decisions in courts across the world. This will be
particularly effective if the IAAF allows athletes to appeal to an
independent arbitrator such as the proposed modified CAS. 191
The other solution is to keep the present procedure intact, but
to ensure that the test results and the methods used for administer-
ing the tests, including the chain of custody requirements, are infal-
lible. The Dubin Commission recommended taking more athletes'
urine, while testing only some of the samples, so that more athletes
face the possibility of testing.192 Random testing and an on-the-spot
determination of the result, or some other change in the rules, may
ensure perfect results; however, this appears to be a nearly impos-
sible task. The IAAF cannot keep its present appeals process with-
out making its testing procedures absolutely accurate. The risk of
erroneous deprivation of athletes' opportunities by suspension,
without a hearing first, is too great.
International organizations obviously cannot mimic the rules
of all its member nations; sports organizations, however, cannot of-
fend the rights of athletes from any country. Thus, unless all the
countries that participate in the Olympics decide to grant the
IAAF the power to enforce international sports law, the best solu-
tion is to give athletes who test positive for performance-enhancing
drugs an opportunity to be heard in front of a neutral tribunal
before their rights are rescinded. Again, more uniformity with
others' laws will lead to fewer challenges in courts of law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Olympic Games are events in which the world should
peacefully join together to enjoy sport. The Olympics are not the
proper forum for political disputes between states and interna-
tional bodies. There should only be competition between individu-
als, and nations should compete to determine physical strength,
191. See supra text accompanying notes 145-59.
192. DUBIN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 541.
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speed, and skill. Sports, drugs, and politics are incompatible.
When they are integrated, one athlete may not be able to compete,
or even worse, a country may not be able to field a team if the
IAAF and courts are involved. Unfortunately, drugs are prevalent
in sports, and drug testing is necessary.193 The rules that the IFs
and especially the IAAF establish to ensure clean competition
among their athletes must be followed for an athlete to be banned.
If the IAAF does not abide by its own rules, it cannot expect its
members to do so. Because of the high stakes involved, the com-
petence and integrity of the system will always be challenged un-
less there is more uniformity in decisions and until the final
arbitrator is changed. Furthermore, the rules enacted by the IAAF
must be changed to allow a hearing before there is a ruling on an
athlete's eligibility.
Hopefully, the IAAF, NFs, and individual athletes will reach a
solution quickly, before the 1994 Winter Olympics and especially
before the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics. Otherwise, if the
IAAF and the U.S. courts continue to reach contrary decisions
over athletes' claims, the courts' decisions will be enforced. United
States courts can use Reynolds as precedent to find the IAAF ame-
nable to suit. Because of this "threat," the IAAF wants Congress
to pass legislation concerning the jurisdiction over the IAAF. This
is an unlikely occurrence. If the IAAF abides by its own rules as
strictly as it applies them to its athletes and NFs, and all three
groups recognize some independent arbitrator-like the proposed
CAS, who can resolve disputes over testing procedures quickly and
efficiently-there would be no need for Congressional legislation.
The modified CAS is the best solution to problems such as the one
Butch Reynolds faced.194
Hilary Joy Hatch
193. Although track and field has made progress over the past years, it is "now per-
ceived as a drug-ridden sport. If the sport hopes to eradicate that perception, it must find a
way to make testing procedures more reliable. Bad drug testing is worse than none at all."
Merrell Noden, A True Test?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 22, 1992, at 9.
194. As this Note was going to press, the Tonya Harding-Nancy Kerrigan Olympic fig-
ure-skating controversy erupted. Before the National Competition in Detroit, Michigan,
several men connected with Harding executed a plot to injure Harding's rival, Nancy Ker-
rigan. Although the injury prevented her from skating in the Nationals, Kerrigan made the
U.S. Olympic team. Harding also made the team by finishing first in the Nationals. Har-
ding, eventually implicated in the incident, insisted on her innocence; however, the USOC
decided to hold a disciplinary hearing concerning the incident and Harding's subsequent
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conduct a week before the 1994 Winter Olympic Games. As a result, Harding sued the
USOC in Clackamas County, Oregon, to obtain an injunction against the USOC. She
relied on many .of the same arguments that Butch Reynolds had used in his civil suit. Be-
cause of Judge Patrick Gilroy's encouragement, Harding and the USOC settled the matter;
the USOC dropped its plans to press administrative charges against Harding, and Harding
dropped her $20 million lawsuit. Nonetheless, Tonya Harding may still face civil and crimi-
nal liabilities that may result in USOC and/or U.S. Figure Skating Association sanctions.
See David A. Kaplan & Patricia Rogers, This Skating Judge Wears a Robe, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 44-45.
The Harding-Kerrigan controversy confirms the importance of establishing an in-
dependent arbitrator to resolve Olympic disputes. Based on Reynolds, American athletes
have a great inducement to sue the organization, like the USOC or the IAAF, which ac-
cuses them of wrong-doing. Furthermore, courts do not perceive these organizations as
fair because they do not observe the due process rights that their constitutions grant to the
athletes. The USOC worried about the precedential value of Reynolds, and its worries
were well-founded. Without the successful negotiations between the two parties in the
Harding case, this case could have hurt the USOC. Therefore, the need for an independ-
ent arbitrator, one who is seen as neutral and who will respect athletes' rights, has never
been greater.
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